Recherche vérifiée par sources: Kraken

Verified source facts

1. Kraken identifies https://id.kraken.com/sign-in as its official sign-in URL in its phishing guidance. 2. Kraken says the first sign-in 2FA method must be a roaming method before a device-bound passkey can be added. 3. Kraken's current multiple-2FA guidance says an account can enable up to five passkeys and one authenticator app after the initial method. 4. Kraken's legal page says terms and service availability differ by residence and that geographic restrictions may apply.

Comparison at a glance

1. Control test: Official domain

An API-security disclosure is meaningful only when converted into a testable control. For official domain, inspect the exact sign-in origin and TLS state. Create a key in a non-production or least-privileged context where available, then bookmark https://id.kraken.com/sign-in. Capture the permission screen without recording the secret, and verify that a forbidden operation is actually rejected.

Model the failure path, not just the setup path. Ask how a leaked credential could be used, what network restriction would stop it, which log would reveal the attempt, and how quickly the key could be revoked. Platform documentation describes supported settings; it cannot prove that a user or vendor configured them correctly. In this dimension, compromise of the local device is therefore an explicit audit gap.

Score disclosures separately from security outcomes. Clear documentation, restrictive defaults, IP binding, asymmetric signing, expiration, and audit visibility are positive signals. They do not certify the exchange, the third-party bot, or the operator's endpoint. The useful output is a remediation list tied to permissions and owners.

2. Control test: Regional availability

For regional availability, inspect terms and services for the residence. Create a key in a non-production or least-privileged context where available, then open the current jurisdiction-specific legal page.

In this dimension, approval of a new account is therefore an explicit audit gap.

3. Control test: Device inventory

For device inventory, inspect phones, computers and hardware keys available. Create a key in a non-production or least-privileged context where available, then list two independent authenticators before changing settings.

In this dimension, future device loss is therefore an explicit audit gap.

4. Control test: Roaming first method

For roaming first method, inspect a passkey usable beyond one browser instance. Create a key in a non-production or least-privileged context where available, then add the required roaming method first.

In this dimension, provider synchronization behavior is therefore an explicit audit gap.

5. Control test: Cross-device passkey

For cross-device passkey, inspect phone or password-manager backed authentication. Create a key in a non-production or least-privileged context where available, then follow the QR and Bluetooth flow on trusted devices.

In this dimension, cloud account recovery is therefore an explicit audit gap.

6. Control test: Hardware security key

For hardware security key, inspect a physical FIDO2 authenticator. Create a key in a non-production or least-privileged context where available, then register and label a spare key separately.

In this dimension, hardware failure is therefore an explicit audit gap.

7. Control test: Device-bound passkey

For device-bound passkey, inspect a credential tied to one browser or device. Create a key in a non-production or least-privileged context where available, then add it only after a roaming fallback exists.

In this dimension, browser-profile loss is therefore an explicit audit gap.

8. Control test: Account labels

For account labels, inspect clear descriptions for each authenticator. Create a key in a non-production or least-privileged context where available, then name methods by device and custody owner.

In this dimension, future interface wording is therefore an explicit audit gap.

9. Control test: Recovery test

For recovery test, inspect access when the primary device is unavailable. Create a key in a non-production or least-privileged context where available, then test a second method without deleting the first.

In this dimension, support recovery outcome is therefore an explicit audit gap.

10. Control test: Secret boundary

For secret boundary, inspect passwords, codes, biometrics and recovery material. Create a key in a non-production or least-privileged context where available, then keep all secrets inside official device prompts.

In this dimension, endpoint malware risk is therefore an explicit audit gap.

Decision scenarios

Scenario 1: when official domain becomes decisive

Consider a reader whose main constraint is the exact sign-in origin and TLS state. The correct response is not to infer a universal platform or product winner. It is to bookmark https://id.kraken.com/sign-in, retain the evidence, and define a stop condition before funds or permissions are committed. If the evidence changes, the decision must be reopened. This produces a repeatable operating rule rather than a one-time opinion.

Scenario 2: when regional availability becomes decisive

Consider a reader whose main constraint is terms and services for the residence. It is to open the current jurisdiction-specific legal page, retain the evidence, and define a stop condition before funds or permissions are committed.

Scenario 3: when device inventory becomes decisive

Consider a reader whose main constraint is phones, computers and hardware keys available. It is to list two independent authenticators before changing settings, retain the evidence, and define a stop condition before funds or permissions are committed.

Scenario 4: when roaming first method becomes decisive

Consider a reader whose main constraint is a passkey usable beyond one browser instance. It is to add the required roaming method first, retain the evidence, and define a stop condition before funds or permissions are committed.

Scenario 5: when cross-device passkey becomes decisive

Consider a reader whose main constraint is phone or password-manager backed authentication. It is to follow the QR and Bluetooth flow on trusted devices, retain the evidence, and define a stop condition before funds or permissions are committed.

Scenario 6: when hardware security key becomes decisive

Consider a reader whose main constraint is a physical FIDO2 authenticator. It is to register and label a spare key separately, retain the evidence, and define a stop condition before funds or permissions are committed.